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The Effects of Legislating
Prompt Corrective Action on
the Bank Insurance Fund
I HE FEDERAL DEPOSIT lnsur-ance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991 (hereafter,
FDICIA) authorized more federal government
funds for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration and made major changes in the supervi-
sion and regulation of depository institutions.
One section of FDICIA requires supervisors to
take prompt corrective action when an institu-
tion’s capital ratio falls below the required lev-
el.’ Banks that are classified as well-capitalized
or adequately capitalized are subject to the
fewest constraints on their activities (see table
I). Supervisors are required to impose limits on
the activities of banks with relatively low capital
ratios and to close them promptly if their capital
ratios fall below some critical level. Some exam-
ples of the constjaints on poorly capitalized
banks include limits on their asset growth, divi-
dends and various insider transactions.
As EDICIA states, the purpose of prompt cor-
rective action is “to reso’ve the problems of in-
sured depository institutions at the least possible
long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund.”
The legislation is based on the assumption that
losses to the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) would
have been lower in recent years if supervisors
had acted as required by FDICIA. This paper in-
vestigates whether the evidence is consistent
with the assumptions that underlie the case for
this legislation.
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A few years ago, as part of a program to re-
form the supervision and regulation of depository
institutions, several economists began promoting
proposals for prompt corrective action (PCA) by
supervisors.2 The report on financial reform by
the Treasury Department in February 1991 in-
cluded a version of these early proposals.~The
General Accounting Office recommended a su-
‘The legislation applies to the supervisors of commercial
banks and thrift institutions. This paper refers exclusively to
commercial banks and the effects of their failure on the
Bank Insurance Fund. The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) insures the deposits of banks and savings
and loan associations but maintains a separate fund for
banks. Banks pay their premiums into the Bank Insurance
Fund which then covers any losses when a bank fails.
2Brookings Institution (1989) and Shadow Financial Regula-
tory Committee (1989).
3Department of the Treasury (1991), pp. 39-41.Table 1
Supervisory Actions Applicable to Depository Institutions under Provisions of
the FDICIA for Prompt Corrective Actionl
Capital Category MandatoryActions
Well capitalized or adequately capitalized May not make any capital distribution or pay a management fee to a con




Subject to provision applicableto well capitalized and adequately capital-
ized institutions
Subject to increased monitoring
Must submit an acceptable capital restoration plan within 45 days and im
plement that plan
Gro vth of total ssets must be restricted
Prior approval from the appropriate agency is required prior to acquisi-
tions branching, and new lines of business
Discretionary Actions
Subject to anydiscretionary actions applicable tosignificantly under-
capitalized institutions if the appropriate agency determines that those ac
tions are necessary to carry out the purposes of PCA.
Significantly undercapitalized Mandatory Actions
Subject toall provisions applicable to undercapitalized institutions
Bonuses and raises to senior executive officers must be restricted
Subiect to at least one of the discretionary actions for significantly under-
capitalized institutions
Discretionary Actions
Actions the institution is presumed subject to unless the appropriate agen-
cy determines that such actions would not further the purposes of PCA.
Must raise additional capital or arrange to be merged with another in-
stitution.
Transactions with affiliates must be res ricted by requiring compliance
with section 23A ofthe Federal Reserve Act as if exemptions ofthat
section did not apply
Interest rates paid on deposits must be restricted to prevailing rates in
the region
Other discretionary actions:
Severe restriction on asset growth or reduction of total assets may be
required
Institution or its subsidiaries may be required to terminate, reduce, or
alter any activity determined to pose excessive risk.
May be required to hold a new election ofits board ofdirectorsTable 1 (continued)
Supervisory Actions Applicable to Depository Institutions under Provisions of
the FDICIA for Prompt Corrective Action1
capital Category Discretionary Actions -
Significantly undercapitalized (continued) Other discretionary actions (continued)
Dismissal of any director or senior executive officer and their replace-
ment by new officers subject to agency approval may be required.
May be prohibited from accepting deposits from correspondent deposi-
tory institutions.
Controlling bank holding company may be prohibited from paying divi-
dends without prior Federal Reserve approval
May be required to divest or liquidate any subsidiary in danger of be
coming insolvent and posing a significant risk to the institution
Any controlling company may be required to divest or liquidate any
nondepository institution affiliate in danger of becoming insolvent and
posing a significant risk to the institution
May be required to take any other actions that the appropriate agency
determines would better carry out the purposes of PCA
Critically undercapitalized Mandatory Actions
Must be placed in receivership within 90 days unless the appropriate
agency and the FDIC concur that other action would better achieve the
purposes of PCA
Must be placed in receivership if it continues to be critically undercapital-
ized, unless specific statutory requirements are met.
After 60 days, must be prohibited from paying principal or interest on
subordinated debt without prior approval of the FDIC.
Activities must be restricted. At a minimum may not do the following
without the prior written approval of the FDIC:
Enter into any material transaction other than in the usual course of
business
Extend credit for any highly leveraged transaction
Make any material change in accounting methods.
Engage in any ‘covered transactions” as defined in section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, which concerns affiliate transactions
Pay excessive compensation or bonuses
Pay interest on new or renewed liabilities at a rate that would cause the
weighted average cost of funds to significantly exceed the prevailing
rate in the institution’s market area.
Discretionary Actions
Additional restrictions (other than those mandated) may be placed on
activities.
This description of the mandatory and discretionary supervisory actions under PCA is derived from a proposal by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in July 1992 to implement the PCA provisions of FDICIA Other
regulations to be adopted by supervisors will make distinctions among institutions based on their capital category
including regulations on brokered deposits and interbank depositspervisory system in which supervisors would be
required to act based on certain indicators of
the performance and behavior of depository in-
stitutions, as well as capital ratios.4
Proponents of legislating PCA, including the
Treasury and others, have based their case for
PCA largely on the incentive for banks to assume
risk, not on evidence of the behavior of poorly
capitalized banks. The recent behavior of savings
and loan associations provided most of the evi-
dence that depository institutions assumed
greater risk as their capital ratios declined.5 The
following quote illustrates the thinking of PCA
advocates:
As banks approach the point of economic in-
solvency, they have less and less to lose from
pursuing aggressive, high-risk investment strate-
gies in an attempt to return to profitability. The
supervisory free rein given undercapitalized
thrifts during the t9SOs is widely recognized as
a leading factor contributing to the cost of
iesolving insolvent thrifts. Some argue that com-
mercial hank supervision has been far from per-
fect, too. In this view, banks are allowed to carry
assets on their books at unrealistically optimis-
tic values and are not appropriately restrained
from high-risk behavior and irresponsible divi-
dend policy.6
The direct method of determining whether
PCA legislation will reduce the BIF’s losses is to
enact the legislation, then observe BIF losses fot’
several years. Waiting several years to form an
opinion about the effectiveness of PCA legisla-
tion, however, does not seem the best way. If
PCA legislation turns out to be ineffective, we
will have wasted valuable time during which
more effective reforms could have been doing
their job.
This paper takes an indirect approach.
specifying the assumptions that underlie PCA
legislation and determining whether the be-
havior of banks before FDICJA’s passage sup-
ports these assumptions. The case for PCA legis-
lation rests on the assumption that, in recent
years, depository institutions assumed greater
risk as their capital ratios declined. As poorly
capitalized institutions assumed greater risk and
failed, they added to the losses of the deposit
insurance funds. Advocates of PCA legislation
also assume that constraints on bank behavior
mandated by PCA legislation will constrain the
risk assumed by poorly capitalized institutions.
The evidence that savings and loan associa-
tions assumed greater risk as their capital ratios
declined, of course, does not necessarily indicate
that PCA legislation will reduce the BIF’s losses.
Commercial bank supervisors may simply have
been more effective than the supervisors of sav-
ings and loan associations in constraining the
risk assumed by poorly capitalized institutions.~
Recent studies examine whether poorly
capitalized banks have violated the types of con-
straints that will be imposed under PCA. Gilbert
(1991) reported that the behavior of most of the
banks with capital ratios below the minimum
required level in 1985-89 did not violate such
constraints.~Large majorities of the banks
reduced their assets while undercapitalized,
refrained fr-om paying dividends, and restrained
loans to insiders. Recent studies of the “capital
crunch” report a positive association between
the lagged capital ratios of banks and the growth
rates of their assets in the current period.
These results are consistent with the view that
supervisors effectively constrained the asset
growth of poorly capitalized banks.9
French (1991) found that, through reports by
banks and examinations, supervisors vvere able
to detect the weakness of most failed banks
several years before failure. In addition, the in-
cidence of paying dividends was lower at poor’ly
capitalized banks than at other banks, and the
incidence of capital injections was higher. Home
(1991) presented additional evidence on the as-
sociation between capital ratios and dividends.
4U.S. General Accounting Office (1991), pp. 59-71.
5Barth, Bartholomew and Labich (1989) and Garcia (1988).
5Department of the Treasury (1991), pp. X-1 to X-2.
‘Several studies examine the incentive for poorly capitalized
institutions with deposit insurance to assume risk. See
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), Chirinko and Guill (1991) and
Keeley and Furlong (1990).
°Gilbert(1991) does not report observations on the banks
that reduced their assets while undercapitalized. About 53
percent reduced their assets by more than 10 percent
while undercapitalized, and about 22 percent reduced their
assets by more than 25 percent.
9Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and Rosengren
(1992a, b)..7
Some banks paid dividends while their earnings
were negative and capital ratios were below re-
quired levels, but the proportion of banks pay-
ing dividends is positively related to their capital
ratios.1” These studies are consistent with the
view that, in recent years, supervisors of com-
mercial banks influenced the behavior of most
undercapitalized banks in ways that will be re-
quired under PCA legislation. ‘I’he exceptional
cases may be eliniinated by PCA legislation.
One argument for PCA legislation is that the
sanctions to be imposed on poorly capitalized
banks will induce other’ banks to maintain their
capital ratios above minimum requfred levels, to
reduce the chance that they will be subject to
the sanctions. The evidence, however, implies
that most poorly capitalized banks were subject
to the sanctions prior to PCA legislation. That
legislation, therefore, is not incentive for banks
to raise their capital ratios.
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Even if PCA legislation has a limited impact on
the behavior of banks while undercapitalized, it
may achieve its basic objective of reducing BIF
losses by reducing the length of time banks re-
main poorly capitalized. ‘the length of time a
bank opet-ates with a low capital ratio ma in-
fluence the risk it assumes because it takes time
for some non-marketable bank assets to mature
befot-e the proceeds can be reinvested in higher-
risk categories. B~’shortening the time banks
ai-e permitted to operate ~vith low capital ratios,
supervisors will limit their opportunities to act
on incentives to assume greater risk.” ‘this ar-
gument rests on the assumption that there is a
positive association between the length of time
banks were poorly capitalized before failure
and the BIE losses resulting from their failure.
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To test the hypothesis that ratios of BIF losses
to total assets are positively related to the
length of time banks were poorly capitalized
prior to their failure, one must specify the fol-
lowing: first, a measure of capital, second, a
criterion for classifying banks as poorly capital-
ized, and third, the lag between changes in cap-
ital ratios and changes in risk assumed by
poorly capitalized banks.”
The paper uses two measures of capital: equi-
tv and an alternative measure, which adjusts eq-
uity for the market value of securities and for
nonperforming loans. The criterion for an ade-
quately capitalized bank is specified initially as a
capital-to-asset ratio of 5 percent or more. This
level is based on the maximum leverage ratio
under the new risk-based capital requirements.
F’or banks with relatively poor asset quality, su-
per~’~o~ may specify a minimum ratio of Tier
I capital (essentially the same as equity foir most
banks) to total assets as high as 5 percent. The
‘°Horne(1991) reported the results of an equation for predict-
ing the ratio of dividends to assets. In that model, profit
rates and capital ratios have positive coefficients.
‘‘This paper does not consider all the possible effects of
PCA legislation on BIF losses. It is possible that closing
banks with low but positive capital ratios will increase BIF
losses, for the following reasons: First, some banks eventu-
ally would recover with no losses to BIF It is difficult to es-
timate the size of this effect with data for periods before
FDICIA, since a change in the closure rule may change
the behavior of other parties. Shareholders of the banks
that ultimately recover may realize that their banks have
good prospects and iniect capital more quickly than they
would have in the past. Second, some theoretical models
indicate that an increase in the capital threshold at which
banks are closed causes banks with certain characteristics
to assume greater risk. See Levonian (1991).
“See Bovenzi and Murton (1988) for a description of loss es-
timates and an analysis of the determinants of FDIC losses
from individual bank failures. The sample in this paper ex-
cludes savings banks insured by theBIF Since savings banks
hold different types of assets than commercial banks, the
determinants of BIF losses for failed savings banks are
likely to be different than for failed commercial banks.
Thus, the sample includes only failed commercial banks.
A few banks are excluded because they did not report
total assets one year before failure and because of other
problems with missing data. Sixteen banks are excluded
from the sample because they were involved in mergers
within two years of their failure dates. Six bank holding
companies in Texas had all of their bank subsidiaries
closed at the same time, for a total of 88 failed banks. BIF
losses attributed to at least some of these banks reflect
problems at their affiliates. These 88 banks are excluded
from the sample to avoid problems in relating BIF losses to
the characteristics of individual failed banks.
Thirty-nine banks were in existence less than three years
when they failed. Since new banks tend to have relatively
high capital ratios and rapid asset growth, these banks
might distort the analysis as outliers in some comparisons.
These 39 banks are retained in the sample. Effects of
deleting these banks are noted where the difference would
affect the description of the data.
Y/A.U’GLiST 1292analysis in this paper is modified to consider
other capital ratios as well.”
Advocates of PCA legislation do not specify
ho~•vquickly they assume poorly capitalized in-
stitutions increase their risk after their capital
ratios decline. Bather than picking an arbitrary
lag, we divide banks into three groups based on
the length of time their equity capital ratios
were below 5 percent before failttre (table 2).
Banks in group one had equity capital ratios be-
low 5 percent for five or more consecutive
quarters before failum’e. The choice of this peri-
od reflects seasonal patterns in bank accounting
practices and capital injections. (Capital injec-
tions and accounting entries that recognize
loans as losses tend to be clustered in the
fourth quarter.) A bank with a relatively low
capital ratio for five or more quarters would
have a relatively low capital ratio in more than
one calendar year, no mattet when in the year
a bank is declared a failed bank.
Suppose, for instance, that a hank failed in
February 1990. If the equity capital ratio of the
bank was below 5 percent for five or more con-
secutive quarters, its ratio would have been be-
low 5 percent at least as early as the fourth
quarter of 1988. Thus, as early as then, the
shareholders of the hank exhibited their inabili-
ty or unwillingness to inject the capital neces-
sary to raise the ratio to 5 percent and did not
eliminate the capital deficiency in subsequent
quarters.
‘Fable 2 also includes an intermediate group of
banks that had relatively lo~vequity capital ra-
tios bekveen two and four consecutive quarters
before failure (group two). If the groups in table
2 reflect relevant time periods, the arguments
for PC:~legislation would imply that the TIfF loss
ratios would be highest for banks in group 1
and lowest for banks in group 3.’~comparison
of average ratios of BIF losses to total assels at
the failui-e dates does reflect this pattern, but
the differences in the mean BIF’ loss ratios are
not statistically significant.
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The comparisons of the ratios of BIF losses to
total assets on the dates of their failure are sub-
ject to a bias. The longer capital ratios of banks
were below 5 percent before failure, the larger
the percentage decline in assets in their last
year. Banks with equity (:apital ratios below 5
percent for five or more consecutive quarters
had asset declines, on average, of more than
14.5 percent. The aver-age percentage declme in
assets was more than 11 percent for banks with
equity capital ratios below 5 pci-cent for two to
four consecutive quarters. ‘I’he other banks, in
contrast, had average asset growth of about 2.5
percent.
These differences appear to reflect the in-
fluence of super-visors, based on the following
assumptions. First, supervisors rate the financial
strength of banks largely on the basis of capital
ratios derived from the report of condition. Se-
cond, banks respond to directives from their su-
pervisors to raise capital ratios by reducing
assets. And third, the longer a bank is subject
to pressure from its supervisor to raise its capi-
tal ratio, the larger the percentage decline in its
assets.
Data on banks that paid dividends in the year
ending on their failure (late also appear to reflect
the influence of supervisors, adding support to
the view that supervisors influenced the asset
growth of undercapitalized banks in their last
year. Bank regulations restrict dividend pay-
meets whenever capital is below the required
level,’~While some undercapitalized banks have
violated these regulations, most have foregone
dividend payments. Less than 7 percent of the
banks with equity’ capital ratios below 5 percent
for five or more consecutive quarters before
failure paid dividends in their last year. The
proportion of failed banks that paid dividends in
their last ~‘ear is significantly higher for groups
of banks with higher capital ratios in their last
year.
“Spong (1990), pp. 64-71, and Keeton (1989) describe the
risk-based capital requirements and maximum leverage
ratios.
‘4See Spong (1990), pp. 64-71, for a description of the regu-
lation of bank dividends in the years covered by this study.
In general, banks were prohibited from withdrawing or im-
pairing their capital through excessive dividend payouts or
other means. Member banks (national banks and state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System) were required to obtain regulatory approval to pay
dividends that exceeded the sum of net profits for a year
and retained earnings for the preceding two years. For any
banks with federal deposit insurance, dividend payments
that could endanger a bank could be restricted under the
general enforcement and cease and desist powers of the
federal supervisors. See Gilbert (1991), French (1991) and
Home (1991) for additional information on dividend pay-
ments by poorly capitalized banks.Table 2
Distribution of BIF Loss Ratios by the Length of Time Before Failure That
Capital Ratios Were Below 5 Percent, 1985-90
Loss to DIE divided by total Percentage
assets Percentage of banks
change in that paid
Total assets total assets dividends in
Total assets one year in the year tI-ie year end
Group Number as of failure before failure ending on trig on failure
number Characteristicsof failed banks of banks date date failure date date
Equity capital ratio below 5 374 02736 0.2196 —14.52 642%
percent for five or more (01365) (01171) (14.40)
consecutive quarters before
failure
2 Equity capital ratio below 5 302 0.2693 02145 —11.15 2517
percent in the last two (0.1184) (01022) (14 07)
quarters before failure and
up to four consecutive quarters
before failure
3 Failed banks other than those 178 0.2629 02522 245 44.94
in groups I and 2 (0.1320) (01536) (23.47)
4 Alternative capital ratio below 546 0.2716 0.2200 1321 1117
5 percent for five or more (01313) (01142) (1454)
consecutive quarters before
failure
5 Alternative capital ratio below 219 0.2752 0.2247 —8.09 33.79
5 percent in the last two (0.1226) (01078) (1597)
quarters before failure and up
to four consecutive quarters
before failure
6 Failed banks other than those 89 02456 0.2649 12 26 50.56
in groups 4 and 5 (01320) (01807) (28.23)
NOTE Standard deviatons are in parentheses under means
statistics, in absolute value for differences between means for groups:
I and 2 0438 0.604 3064 6695
1 and 3 0.880 2506 8.884 9.782
2 and 3 0.533 2916 7.023 4.406
4 and 0360 0.536 4110 6521
4 and 6 1724 2.271 8333 7203
SandS 1.820 1962 6397 2046
statistics in absolute value, for difference in proportions
Statistically significant atthe 5 percent level.The observations in table 2 are consistent
with the view that supervisors forced most
banks with persistently low capital ratios before
failure to reduce their assets and refrain from
paying dividends. Supervisors may have been
less aware of the troubles of banks with capital
ratios above .5 percent during most or all of
their last year, and, therefore, placed less con-
straint on their behavior.
The higher average BIF loss ratios of the
banks undercapitalized for longer periods may
reflect sharp declines in assets in their last year,
rather than losses on investments in riskier as-
sets. BIF loss ratios can be adjusted for this bias
by dividing the losses to BIF by assets one year
before failure. Average ratios of BIF losses to to-
tal assets one year before failure for banks in
groups 1 and 2 are significantly lower than the
average BIF loss ratio of those in group 3. After
adjusting for the effects of this bias, the evi-
dence does not indicate a positive association
between the length of time banks were under-
capitalized before failure and BIF loss ratios.
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Advocates of PCA legislation have emphasized
the need for improvements in measuring the
value of bank capital. Perhaps a positive rela-
tionship between BIF loss ratios and the length
of time bank capital ratios were low before
failure is evident only with an improved meas-
ure of bank capital.
Alternative capital measures often are described
as “market value” capital, with assets and liabili-
ties marked to market values.15 Berger, King
and O’Brien (199i) indicate the various mean-
ings attached to the term “market value” and
the practical difficulties in deriving accurate
measures of the market values for some catego-
ries of assets and liabilities. The authors sug-
gest, however, the following adjustments to the
value of bank assets: adjust marketable assets to
market values, and adjust the value of loans for
anticipated losses on nonperforming loans.
The following calculations yield an alternative
capital measure which reflects these adjust-
ments. The difference between the book and
market value of securities is subtracted from
equity. Adjustments to equity for anticipated
loan losses involve comparisons of allowances
for loan and lease losses to the values of non-
performing loans (past due 90 days or longer or
nonaccrual). The allowance for loan losses is ac-
cumulated earnings of a bank set aside to ab-
sorb loan losses.’°Evidence in Berger, King and
O’Brien indicates that a $3 increase in nonper-
forming loans tends to increase loan losses by
$1. If a bank’s allowance for loan losses equals
or exceeds one-third of its nonperforming loans,
there is no adjustment to its equity for antici-
pated loan losses. The other banks need larger
allowances for loan losses to meet this standard.
Increases in their allowances would come out of
equity. The adjustment to equity involves sub-
tracting one-third of their nonperforming loans
and adding their allowance for loan losses.
The results in table 3 add support to use of
the three-to-one ratio of nonperforrning loans to
the allowance for loan losses in deriving the al-
ternative capital measure. Table 3 presents this
ratio for banks in various size categories, from
one quarter to eight quarters before failure.
The ratio is around three for banks of different
size and for different lengths of time prior to
failure.
Table 3 also has implications for the supervi-
sory treatment of banks as they approach
failure. As indicated above, the case for PCA
legislation is based on the argument that in re-
cent years supervisors should have done their
job differently. For example, supervisors should
have forced banks to make their balance sheets
reflect more accurately the value of their assets.
Supervisors may have allowed troubled banks to
show higher equity on their balance sheets than
justified by the quality of their assets, by per-
mitting their allowance for loan losses to lag be-
hind the rise in their nonperforming loans as
they approached failure. Additions to the al-
lowance for loan losses (called provisions for
loan losses) are bank expenses. Thus, additions
to the allosvance for loan losses reduce earnings
and possibly equity, if earnings are negative.
Table 3 shows that, while the ratio of nonper-
forming loans to total assets rose as banks ap-
“Mondschean (1992) discusses the issues raised by
proposals for market value accounting.
‘6See the appendix for a more thorough discussion of the
role of the allowance for loan losses in bank accounting
principles.Table 3
Average Ratios of Nonpertorming Loans to the Allowance for Loan and Lease
Losses and to Total Assets’
Size category of banks Quarters before failure
(millions of dollars as of
failuredate~ 1 2 --
Assets c $25
NPL — ALLL 289 307 326 aos 293 309 294 295
NFL TA 00777 0.0720 00677 00608 005~0 00504 00431 0.0390
$25 < Assets c $50
NPL ALLL 268 319 319 3.03 283 287 272 2.82
NFL — IA 0.0892 0.0803 00703 00618 00539 00487 00443 00392
$50 Assets c 5100
NFL — ALLL 3.40 281 306 3.14 318 ~02 316 3.13
NFL - TA 009’9 00789 00717 00663 0.0587 00552 00487 00438
$100 Assets
NFL ALLL 3.30 321 372 3.80 341 3.58 353 ass
NFL — TA 01049 00906 0.0808 00704 00595 00526 00495 0.0426
NFL —. Nonperfammning loans fpast due 90 days or mome plus nor.accmuafl
ALLL — Allowance for oan and lease losses
TA — Total assets
1
1n total. 836 banks filed reports at condition for rhe quarter er’ong one quamtor befomo failure and for the pmecedinq seven
quaners. The ratios are calculated as the sum of tne item in the numerator divided by tne sum of the tem in the
denominato’ for a g’ven group of banKs.
proached failure, their allowances for loan loss- banks with adjusted capital ratios below 5 per-
es also rose proportionately. These results are cent for longer periods. Use of the alternative
inconsistent with one type of forbearance by su- capital measure does riot yield a positive associa-
pervisors: a general tendency to permit the al- tion between the length of time banks operated
lowance for loan losses to lag behind the rise in with low capital ratios before failure and BIF
nonperforming loans, to avoid large charges loss ratios.
against equity.
Table 2 presents average BIF loss ratios based
on this alternative tneasure of capital. The ad- .. -
-. - . Perhaps the difficulty in findtng an inverse
justments to equttv reduce the capital ratios for .-
-. . relationship between capital rattos before failure
many of the failed banks tn their last year. For , -.
and BIF loss ratios is that all the results in table
instance, the number of banks with capital ra- -
2 are based on a 5 percent capital ratio. fhe
tios below 5 percent for five or more consecu-
-- . relevant ratio for purposes of the hypothesis
tive quarters before failure rises from 374 with . -
-- . tested here may be higher or lower than S per-
equity as the measure of capital (group 1) to -- -
- .. cent. Table 4 examtnes the relationship between
546 with the alternative measure (group 4). .. . - capital ratios and BIF loss ratios, for a fixed lag
BIF loss ratios adjusted for changes in assets of one year between the observation of capital
in the last year (BIF losses divided by total as- ratios and failure dates. The hypothesis that
sets one year before failure) are lower for poorly capitalized banks assume relatively highrisk, which imposes large losses on BIF if the~’ results do not support the hypothesis that banks
with capital ratios below sonie critical capital ra-
tio have higher BIF loss ratios.
~Afew banks that engaged
in extreme behavior may have imposed large
losses on BIF’. Thus, PCA legislation could con-
tribute to reducing BIF losses by constraining
the extreme behavior of a small minority of
failed banks. The data are examined for such
extreme cases in two ways. ‘l’he first approach
involves determining whether BIF’ loss ratios
“Banks in existence less than three years when they failed
account for the relatively high average BIF loss ratio for
banks with capital ratios in excess of 10 percent one year
prior to failure. Eight of the 30 banks with equity capital ra-
tios in excess of 10 percent one year prior to failure were
in existence less than three years when they failed. Ex-
cluding these eight banks reduces the average BIF loss ma-
ho for the remaining 22 banks to 2372 percent. which is
much closer to the average BIF loss ratios for the banks
with capital ratios below 10 percent one year prior to
failure. Eliminating the banks in existence less than three
years when they failed has a similar effect on the average
BIF loss ratio of banks with ratios of the alternative capital
measure ho total assets in excess of 10 percent one year
prior to failure.
Table 4
Distribution of BIF Loss Ratios by the Ratio of Capital to
Assets One Year Before Failure
Equity as the measure of capital Alternative capital measure
BiF loss divided
by total assets
Group Range of Number one year before
number capital ratio of banks failure
WE loss divided
by total assets
Number one year before
of banks failure
































NOTE Standard deviations are in parentheses under means
fail, implies higher BIF loss rahios for banks
with capital ratios below some critical level he-
foi-e failure.
Table 4 indicates that the banks with the
highest BIF loss ratios are those with the
highest and the lowest capital i-atios one year
before failure. Among other banks, there is no
systematic relationship between the capital ra-
tios of hanks one year before failure and their
ELF loss using either measure of capital. ‘l’heseTable 5
Characteristics of Banks with Relatively High BIF Loss Ratios
Banks with BIF loss All banks in
Characteristics ratios above 50 percent the sample
Number of banks 44 854
Mean percentage change —9 13% —979%
in total assets in their last year
Percentage that paid 2045 21 08
dividends tn their Last year
Percentage with equity capital 5455 43.79
ratio below 5 percent for five
or more consecutive quarters
before failure
Percentage in the West 75.00 56.21
South Central region
Percentage supervised bythe 5682 3770
Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency
werc relatively high among banks that engaged reflect regional effects: three-fourths were locat
in extreme behavior. These banks would have ed in the West South Central region of the na-
the following characteristics: equity capital ratio tion, compared with about 56 percent for the
below 5 percent for five or more consecutiye entire sample.18 A relatively high proportion
quarters before failure, and asset growth and were supervised by the Comptroller of the Cur-
dividend payments in their last year. No banks rency. Thus, an examination of extreme cases
in the sample had this combination of charac- does not provide clear evidence of the effective-
teristics. ness of PCA in reducing BIF losses.
The second approach involves examining the
characteristics of banks with relatively high BIF ~ US S
loss ratios, to determine whether they exhibited ..
-~ . Loss ratios vary substantially within each of extreme behavior that will be constrained under
-- the groups of banks in tables 2 and 4; standard
PCA. Table S presents some of the characteris- deviations are about half as larce as their me-
tres of 44 banks with BIF loss ratios that exceed -.
- . ans. Perhaps an inverse relationship between
cM percent. Iheir mean asset growth and the .. .
-. . . . capital ratios befoi-e failure and BIF loss ratios is
proportion paying dividends in their last year -
-. evident only if other factors are held constant
are almost identical to those for the entire sam- .
-. in regression analysis.
pie. Ihe banks with relatively high BIF loss ra- -
tios do have a somewhat higher percentage ,f Desr’rujstuiin’ n Bsnks in the
with equity capital ratios below 5 percent for
relatively long periods before failure. It is possi-
ble, however, to find other ways in which these The 854 banks in the sample failed in the
banks are even more distinct from the entire years 1985-90 (table 6). Most banks were rela-
sample. Their relatively high loss ratios may tiveiy small: about 60 percent had total assets
‘8States in this region are Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma
and Texas.
Jtiiv/iiS’,flitSTTable 6
Characteristics of Failed Banks in Regression Analysis






1990 14~ - 16.4
Total 854 100.0
Asset size on failure date
(millions of dollars)
Assets < $25 508 595
$25 Assets c $50 209 24.5
$50 Assets c $100 90 10.5
sioc Assets 47 5.5
100.0
Region
New England (NE) 5 0.6
Middle Atlantic (MA) 9 1.1
South Atlantic (SA) 19 2.2
East South Central (ESC) 17 2.0
West South Central (WSC) 480 56.2
East North Central (ENC) 16 1.9
West North Central (WNC) 174 20.4
Pacific Northwest (PNW) 34 4.0




Federal Reserve 68 8.0
FDIC 464 543
100.0
Method of resolving failure
Purcnase and assumption 667 78.1
Transfer of insured deposits 115 i3.5
Liqu;dation 72 - a4
100.0
NOTE: States in census reqions’
New England connecticut. Ma!ne. Massachusetts. New Ha.mpsh~reRhode Islano and
Vermont
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey. New York and Pennsyivan.a
South Atlantic: Delaware Florida, Georgia. Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina.
Virginia and West Virqinia
East South Central Alaoama. Kentucky Mississippi and Tennessee
West Soutn Central: Arkansas. Louisiana. Okiahoma and Texas
East North Central: Illinois. Indiana, Ohio. Michigan ano Wisconsin
West North Central Iowa. Kansas, Minnesota, Mssouri Neoraska. North Dakota and
South Dakota
Pac’fc Nortnwest: Alaska, Idaho. Montana, Oregon. Wash;ngon and Wyoming
Pacific Southwest Arizona. California. Colorado. Hawaii Nevada, New Mexco and Utahless than S25 million, and about 9S percent had
total assets less than $100 million. The failed
banks were heavily concentrated in certain
regions. About 56 percent were in the West
South Central region. About 78 percent of the
cases were resolved when other banks bought
some of the assets of the failed banks and as-
sumed their liabilities. In another 14 percent of
the cases, the FDIC transferred the insured
deposits of failed banks to other banks. In these
cases, the FDIC liquidated the failed banks’ as-
sets and made partial payments to uninsured
depositors, based on the proceeds of liquidated
assets. Failed banks were liquidated in the re-
maining cases.
.h1hnntt’~ inn Ui.E. I~arhabies
The dependent variable is the ratio of ElF loss
to total assets as of failure dateJ~Independent
variables are described in table 7.
(SpiIcil iU1k~: The case for applying PCA
legislation to the supervisors of commercial
banks implies negative, significant coefficients
on the capital ratios lagged one year, EC4 and
AC
~S c i’he coefficient on
GROWTH is assumed to have a negative sign: an
increase (decrease) in assets in the last year is
assumed to increase (decrease) the denominator
of the ElF loss ratio, while having little, if any,
effect on the size of the ElF loss.
Iiirith’ccth; Arguments for legislating PCA
imply a positive sign for the coefficient on DIV:
dividends in the last year, divided by total assets
as of failure date. The coefficient on DIV may he
positive for two reasons. First, dividends are pay-
ments of capital to shareholders, leaving less
capital to absorb reductions in the value of as-
sets. Second, dividends may be a signal that the
shareholders saw little reason to attempt to pre-
vent failure. Instead, they may have paid out
capital in anticipation of failure. These reasons,
however, do not account for possible influences
of supervisors over which banks paid dividends
or the size of their dividend payments.
I One measure of
loan quality is the value of loans that are past
due or nonaccrual. A second measure is the
value of interest accrued on loans that was not
collected. When borrowers fail behind on their
scheduled payments, banks continue to accrue
the interest due from them as income until
their loans are classified as nonaccrual.20
These measures of loan quality may help ex-
plain the ElF losses from the failure of individu-
al banks. The following two measures of asset
quality are included as independent variables:
1. NPL — the ratio of nonperforming loans to
total assets.
2. ACCRUED — interest accrued on loans that
was not collected, divided by total assets.
The coefficients on these variables will have
positive signs under’ the following assumptions:
First, these measures accurately reflect loan
quality. Second, the allowance for loan losses is
not large enough to cover the gap between the
book value of these loans and their value to the
FDIC as the receiver of failed hanks.21
,thcv&c’i chic’ Sc’cc’IiSc,-~ Securities
(various types of bonds) are reported on hank
balance sheets at book values (purchase prices
plus any amortized changes in value), not at
their current market values. Thus) the book
value of equity reflects the book value of securi-
ties. Banks also report infoi-mation on the mar-
ket value of their securities on the report of
condition. The following independent variable is
a measure of the gap between the book and
‘°Avery,Hanweck and Kwast (1985) report the results of
regressions with the same dependent variable. It is difficult
to compare the results in this paper to those, since their
objective was to predict FDIC losses from bank failures,
not to test hypotheses about coefficients on independent
variables. They do not attempt to adjust the specification of
equations for possible collinearity. In Bovenzi and Murton
(1988) and James (1991), the dependent variable is the loss
on assets of failed banks, a concept that is related to BIF
loss. Some of the independent variables in Bovenzi and
Murton and in James are included, with slight modifica-
tions, in this study; the major difference involves measures
of asset quality derived from examination reports, which
are not included in this study. Barth, Bartholomew and
Labich (1989) and Barth, Bartholomew and Bradley (1990)
estimate the coefficients of equations designed to explain
the cost to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration of resolving cases of failed savings and loan as-
sociations. Results in Barth, Bartholomew and Bradley are
not comparable to those in this study, since they include
observations for failed and surviving associations and use
a different statistical technique (Tobit regression analysis).
20Accrued interest that was not collected may not reflect
default by borrowers on scheduled loan payments. In some
loan contracts, such as construction loans, the original
loan contract specifies a delayed schedule of interest
payments.
215ee the appendix for a discussion of accounting principles
which features the role of the allowance for loan losses.Table 7
Identification of Independent Variables
EC4 Ratio of equity capital to total assets four quarters before failure.
AC_4 Ratio of the alternative capital measure to total assets four quarters before
failure.
GROWTH Change in total assets of failed bank in its last year. divided by total assets as of
failure date.
DIV Dividends on common stock paid in the year ending in failure, divided by total
assets as of failure date
NPL Loans and leases past due 90 days or more plus nonaccrual loans divided by
total assets as of failure date
ACCRUED Interest on loans that was accrued but not received on the last report of condi
tion divided by total assets as of failure date
MARKET Book value of securities in the investment account as of the last report of condi
tion minus the market value of the securities divided by total assets as of failure
date.
IDR Last observation available on deposits in accounts up to $100000 each divided
by total assets as of failure date
P&A Dummy variable with a value of unity if a failed bank case was resolved through
purchase and assumption zero otherwise
TID Dummy variable with a value of unity if a failed bank case was resolved through
transfer of insured deposits to another bank zero otherwise
CCC Dummy variable with a value of unity if the bank was a national bank super
vised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, zero otherwise.
FR Dummy variable with a value of unity if a bank was supervised bythe Federal
Reserve, zero otherwise.
nA Natural log of total assets as of failure date.
1985-1989 Dummy variables for the years in which the banks failed.




market value of securities: MARKET — the hook to the gap between the hook value and the mar-
value minus the market value of securities, ket value of securities.
divided by total assets. i’r,’~ ,~/> ,‘~ j’~~,’h j’,:’ :~r’i,S S
The expected sign of the coefficient on MAR- When a bank fails, the FDIC becomes the
KET depends on the conditions under which su- receiver. As receiver, the FDIC must dispose of
pervisors close banks. Suppose they close banks the failed bank’s assets and make payments to
when the hook value of equity is zero or nega- its creditors. ‘the options chosen to resolve each
tive, without adjustments to the book value of case may affect the ElF’s losses. Those choices,
equity for the market value of assets. Under in turn, may reflect additional information ahout
this assumption, the expected sign on MARKET failed banks not captured by the other indepen-
is positive: ElF losses would he related positively dent variables, such as characteristics of thecustomers of failed banks that make them valu-
able to other banks.22
One method of resolving failed hank cases is
liquidation. Failed banks are closed and deposi-
tors are paid off up to the insurance limit per
account. The FDIC liquidates the assets and
makes payments to uninsured depositor’s and
other’ creditors of the failed bank. Shareholders
generally get nothing.
Resolution methods other than liquidation
may be less expensive to ElF. In many cases, a
solvent bank purchases some of the assets of a
failed bank and assumes its liabilities. The FDIC
provides cash to cover the gap between assets
purchased and hahilities assumed. This is called
a purchase arid assumption (P&A) transaction.
The FDIC solicits bids from solvent banks for
the assets and liabilities. Banks hid h offering
premiums; the cash payment by the FDIC to the
hank with the winning hid is net of the premi-
urn. The FDIC generally disposes of failed banks
through P&A transactions if its staff estimates
that the losses wouid be lower than under hqui-
dation.z3 As a result, the variable P&A (dummy
variable for hanks resolved through P&A trans-
actions) is expected to have a negative
coefficient.
In some cases) the FDIC liquidates the assets
of failed banks but solicits bids from other
banks to assume their insured deposits. Bidders
may anticipate long-term profits on the accounts
of customers who choose to keep their’ deposits
with the winning bidder. This method of dispos-
ing of failed banks is called transfer of insured
deposits (T1D). i’he independent variahie ‘ltD
(dummy variable for hank failure cases resolved
through ‘lID) is expected to have a negative
coefficient.
Share at’ Deposits .f’nll,r lasicred ~— James
(1991) found a positive association between the
premiums paid by the winning bidders in P&.A
cases and the shares of deposits of failed banks
that were fulls’ insured (accounts in denomina-
tions of $100,000 or less). The smaller accounts
tend to he more profitable to banks hecause
banks pay less than market interest rates on
them.24
The variable IDE (fully insured deposits divid-
ed by total assets) is included to reflect the com-
position of deposits. It is expected to have a
negative coefficient because premiums paid to
the FDIC by winning bidders are assumed to he
positively related to IDR. An increase in the
premium reduces the loss to ElF.
Federal Sajic reisarc’ .,~:lgeaer— The
primary supervisor of nationally chartered
hanks is the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (0CC). For state-chartered hanks that
are member’s of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Reserve is the primary federal supervi-
sory agency, while, for other state banks, it is
the FDIC. Differences in supervisory practices
among these agencies may affect ELF losses.
Dummy variables (0CC and FR) at-c used to cap-
ture such effects.
Bank Sise — ELF loss ratios may be higher
for smaller banks for two reasons. First, James
(1991) finds that FDIC administrative costs are
higher, per dollar of assets) for smaller failed
banks.25 Second) smaller banks may he subject
to less frequent examination and less thorough
surveillance between examinations than larger
banks. When supervisors discover that relatively
small banks are bankrupt, the percentage losses
on assets may be larger than when larger banks
fail. The hank size variable is the natural log of
total assets as of failure date.
L,aeatian and I’hac’ ~ .Faihcre —~ The re-
maining independent variables are dummy ~‘ati-
ahles for the regions of failed banks and the
years in which they failed, since ELF loss ratios
may vary systematically by region and year of
failure.
tIegre~s’~s’mn Renuthi
Table 8 presents the regression results. The
equations use different measures of capital in
the lagged capital ratio.
;r.rc~f~c~n f’cptnd Ratios — The coeft’icients
on capital ratios four quarters before failure are
not statistically significant. Othet measures yield
the same result. In other regressions not report-
ccl here, the coefficients on dummy variables
22The appendix examines in more detail how resolution
methods affect BIF losses.
23For a discussion of the conditions for disposing of failed
banks through P&A transactions, see Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (1984), pp. 81-108, Bovenzi and Mul-
24See Brunner, Duca and McLaughlin (1991) for information
on the rates banks pay on various types of deposit ac-
counts.
25James (1991), pp. 1234-36.
doon (1990) and Department of the Treasury (1991), pp. -30
through I-SI.for banks with capital ratios below 5 percent The coefficients on NPL and ACCRUED are
for various lengths of time before failure also
are not statistically significant.26
The coefficients on the variables designed to
reflect capital ratios before failure may be bi-
ased toward zero by including independent vari-
ables that reflect the quality and market value
of bank assets. To illustrate, suppose the banks
with persistently low capital ratios shifted their
assets to high-risk categories as they approached
failure, resulting in high ratios of nonperform-
ing loans to total assets on their last reports of
condition. In addition, suppose these banks sold
securities with capital gains and kept securities
with capital losses to boost the book value of
equity as they approached failure. This selective
pattern of securities sales would make values of
the variable MARKET relatively high at the
banks with persistently low capital ratios. The
effects of low capital ratios before failure on
ElF loss ratios would be captured to some ex-
tent in the coefficients on NPL, ACCRUED and
MARKET. To test for this bias, equations I and
2 of table 8 were estimated without the varia-
bles NPL, ACCRUED and MARKET. In results
not reported here, the coefficients on capital ta-
tios before failure were not statistically sig-
nificant.
tither hca’eac:ncdent Varhchhis —, The coeffi-
cient on GROWTH is negative, as hypothesized.
The coefficient on D1V is negative and insignifi-
cant; advocates of PCA legislation implied it
would have been positive.
significant with the positive signs, as hypothe-
sized. The coefficient on MARKET is significant
but the sign is opposite of that hypothesized: a
wider gap between the book value and market
value of securities is associated with a lower ElF
loss.
The negative, signifIcant coefficient on IDR in-
dicates that failed banks with higher ratios of
fully insured deposits to total assets are more
valuable to potential bidders, thus tending to
reduce BIF loss ratios. ‘I’he coefficient on P&A
indicates that BIF loss ratios are lower in P&,A
cases than in liquidation cases, holding other
variables constant.27 ElF loss tatios are not sig-
nificantly lower in TID cases. The coefficient on
0CC is positive and statistically significant. Hold-
ing constant the influences of the other’ in-
dependent variables, BIF loss ratios are about 2
percentage points higher for failed banks with
national charters.28 The coefficient on FR indi-
cates that, among state-chartered banks, there is
no significant effect of Federal Reserve member-
ship on loss ratios, holding constant the other
independent variables.
The coefficient on the natural log of assets is
not statistically significant. In other regressions
not reported here, dummy variables for banks
in var’ious size ranges also were not significant.
The results do not support the hypothesis that
ElF loss ratios are larger for smaller banks,
holding constant other determinants of ELF loss
ratios.
2mThe most comparable results for S&Ls are in Barth, Bar-
tholomew and Labich (1989). In a regression equation with
costs of resolving failed S&Ls as the dependent variable,
tangible net worth on the last quarter reported is a highly
significant variable. The coefficient is negative unity (a $1
increase in capital reduces resolution costs by $1), with a
t-statistic of 13.9. Another significant variable is the number
of months an association was insolvent before failure, which
has a positive coefficient. The contrast of the results in this
paper to those in Barth, Bartholomew and Labich is con-
sistent with the view that the supervisors of commercial
banks were more effective in limiting the risk assumed by
poorly capitalized institutions than the supervisors of S&Ls.
27Bovenzi and Murton (1988) find that, without holding other
factors constant, BIF loss ratios were about 7 percentage
points lower in P&A cases than in liquidation cases in
1985-86, The coefficient on P&A in table 8 indicates about
the same effect.
28Gilbert (1991) found differences in the behavior of banks in
Texas with national charters and those with state charters
that could be interpreted as evidence of differences in
practices among the federal supervisory agencies. National
banks were allowed to operate with capital ratios below
the minimum capital requirement for longer periods than
state-chartered banks, and national banks accounted for
almost all of the Texas banks that operated at least a year
with negative equity. The undercapitalized banks in Texas
with rapid assets growth and those with higher insider
loans while undercapitalized tended to be national banks,
Most of these differences between national and state-
chartered banks were not statistically significant outside
Texas.
These contrasts might indicate that the positive, signifi-
cant coefficients on 0CC in table 8 reflect differences be-
tween national and state-chartered banks in the Southwest.
To test for such a regional effect, the regressions in table 8
were estimated separately for banks in the states covered
by the Dallas office of the 0CC (Arkansas, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas) and for banks in other
states. In each regression, the coefficient on CCC was
positive but not significant at the 5 percent level. The
coefficient on CCC was larger, however, in the regressions
for banks in states outside the Southwest and significant at
the 10 percent level. Thus, the effect on ElF loss ratios of
supervision by the CCC is not restricted to the Southwest,Table 8
Determinants of Bank Insurance Fund Losses Due to Individual Bank Failures
Dependent variable’ Sank Insurance Fund loss divided by total assets as of fauture date
Regression Number Regression Number
Independent Independent
variables 1 2 variables 1 2
intercept 03539 03495 * 1985 —00207 —00200
(5.89) (569) (118) (1 16)
EC —00324 1986 0.0028 —0D034
(022) (0.18) (022)
AC —0.0021 1987 00054 0.0048
(002) (0.38) (033)
GROWTH —0.0442 * —~0451 1988 00214 00211
(2.84) (2 73) (1.53) (1.50)
DIV —14038 —142 1989 0.0255 00255
(134) (1.37) (1.87) (187)
NPL 03554 03533 NE —00544 —0~550
(4J4) (4.69) (1.04) (1.05)
ACCRUED 3.2125 32210 MA 0.0732 —0.0732
(622) (624) (186) (186)
MARKET —12307 * —1 2988 SA —0.0693 * —0.0689
(231) (2 25) (253) (2.51)
IDR 00855 03848 ESC —00883 * —ao877 *
(3.50) (3.48) (304) (302)
PM 00656 00651 ENC 01069 01066 *
(440) (4.35) (360) (3.60)
TID —00024 00021 WNC —01)904 0.0904 *
(013) (012) (729) (730)
CCC 0.0218 00222 PNW 0.0497 * 0.0498 *
(239) (2.45) (2.36) (2 37)
FR 00179 00178 PSW 00659 0.0662
(113) (112) (4.99) (503)
nA ~g~2 R2 02290 0.2291
N 854 854
Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
NCTE: t—statistics are in parentheses under regression coefficients.
The coefficients on dummy variables for in- than for banks in the West South Central
di%idual years are not tatistically significant region.
Coefficients on several regional dumm~varia
bles are negative and significant. I he excluded
region is the West South Central region The
negatit e coefficients on some of the regional The main reason for legislating prompt cor-
dumm~~ariable indicate that, holding constant rective action (PCA) is to reduce losses to
other independent ‘variables, loss ratios are sig- deposit insurance funds. The case for such
nificantly lower for banks in everal regions legi lation rests on the following assumption•20
First, depositors’ institutions have an incentive
to assume greater risk as their capital ratios
decline. Second, the longer an institution oper-
ates with a low capital ratio, the greater its op-
portuttity to act on incentives to assume risk.
Third, supervisors have been ineffective in limit-
ing the risk assumed by poorly capitalized insti-
tutions. Fourth, the insurance fund losses due
to the failure of individual institutions reflect, to
some extent, the risk assumed by these institu-
tions after the~’became poorly capitalized. And
fifth, the actions mandated for supervisors in
the legislation will constrain the risk assumed
by poorly capitalized institutions, thet-ehv limit-
ing insurance fund losses if thes’ fail.
This paper considers the likely effects of pC~\
legislation on ELF losses resulting from the
failure of commercial banks. ‘the mnethod in-
~‘olvcsexamining whether the evidence about
commercial bank behavior and ElF losses sup-
port the assumptions that underlie the case for
PCA legislation. The assumptions imply that the
longer a bank operates with a low capital ratio
before failure, the larger the ElF loss.
The evidence does not support this hvpothe-
sis. The evidence, instead, is consistent with the
h~’pothesisthat, in recent years, super\’isots
have been effective in constraining the risk as-
sumed by poorly capitalized banks. These
results raise doubts about whether PCA legisla-
lion ~~‘ill reduce ElF lcsses,
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pp. 20-30.The text assumes a basic understanding of
hank accounting principles and the methods used
by the FDIC in resolving failed banks. This ap-
pendix provides an introduction to these topics.
The accounting principles can he illustrated
by referring to the balance sheets of a hypo-
thetical bank. Items in table Al reflect book
rather than market values. For instance, the
book value of loans is the sum of the outstand-
ing balances that borrowers owe the bank,
other than the loans that have been declared
losses. Values of marketable securities are book
values, not current market values.
One of the key balance sheet items for our
purposes is the allowance for loan and lease
losses, which represents an accumulation of
past earnings set aside to absorb anticipated fu-
ture losses on loans that become uncollectable.
In accounting statements filed with bank super-
visors, the allowance for loan losses is reported
on the asset side of the balance sheet as a deduc-
tion from loans. Thus, net loans are net of an-
ticipated losses, as reflected in the allowance.
When a hank cannot collect from a borrower,
accounting principles indicate that management
is to declare the loan a loss and charge the loss
against the allowance for loan losses. The ac-
counting entries involve reductions inboth loans
and the allowance.1
Increases in the allowance for loan losses
come out of current earnings. The relevant item
in the income statement is called the “provision
for loan losses,” which is included among bank
expenses. If a hank must make a large provision
for loan losses in a given period, because of ac-
tual or anticipated loan losses, current earnings
may he negative. When current earnings are
negative, equity is reduced.
The top half of table Al presents the balance
sheet of a solvent hank, based on hook value ac-
counting. Securities are recorded at their book
value of $40. The allowance for loan losses is
one-third of nonperforming loans, which the
text indicates is about average for the banks in
the study up to two years before their failure.
The bank could absorb loan losses up to $2
without reducing equity. The ratio of equity to
total assets is above 5 percent.
The financial condition of the bank would
look worse if securities were marked to their
market value of $35. Net worth actually would
be zero.
The bottom half of table Al is the balance
sheet of the same hank after it recognizes some
loan losses. All $6 of the nonperforming loans
turn out to he uncollectable, and an additional
SI of other loans is charged off as a loss. These
losses reduce the allowance and equity to zero.
At this point, the hank is closed and the FDIC
becomes the receiver. The duties of a receiver
of a bankrupt firm are to dispose of its assets
and make payments to its creditors from the
proceeds.
The FUIC’s loss depends on the method used
to resolve this case. Under the liquidation
method, the FDtC would pay the fully insured
depositors $70 and liquidate the assets, sharing
the proceeds of the assets with the uninsured
depositors.~Equation Al indicates the deter-
minants of the loss to BIF under the liquidation
method.
(Al) ElF loss = $70 (payment to fully insured
depositors)
— (70/(70 + 19)) [$5 (cash)
+ $35 (market value of securities)
+ $33 (liquidation value of loans)]
The present value of payments to the uninsured
depositors, on deposits of 519, would be
(A2) (19/89)[S731 = $1558.
Another method of resolving failed banks is
called purchase and assumption. The FDIC
solicits bids from other banks to purchase some
of the assets of the failed bank and to assume
its liabilities. In,,this illustration, the hank with
the winning hid purchases the $5 of cash and
pays $35 for the securities. Whether this hid
would result in a lower loss to BIF than under
1See Walter (1991) for a thorough discussion of the al-
lowance for loan losses.
2 When the FDIC liquidates a bank, it becomes a creditor of
the failed bank for the amount of its payment to the in-
sured depositors. The claim of the FDIC against the assets
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= $12.58Table Al
Balance Sheet of a Hypothetical Bank
PRIOR TO CHARGE-OFF OF LOAN LOSSES
Assets Liabilities
Cash $5 Insured deposits $70





loan losses 24 3 Net worth S
$94 $94
Memo Market value of securities is $35
AFTER CHARGE-OFF OF LOAN LOSSES
Assets Liabilities
Cash $5 Insured deposits $70




Allowance 0 44 Networth 0
$83 $83
Memo Market value of securities is $35
The present value of loans in liquidation, net of liquidation costs, is $33
liquidation depends on the size of the premium ities ot the failed bank, but the FLJIC liquidates
paid by the ~ inning bidder as indicated in the the assets. I he FUIC shares with the uninsured
follox~ ed equation: depositors the premium paid bx the bank that
assumes the insured deposit liabilities ot the
(A3) ElF loss $49 (payment by the FDI(. to failed hank. Equation A4 presents the loss to Elf:
cover the gap between $40 of
assets purchased and $89 of
liabilities assumed (½4) 1311 loss 570 (cash to the hank thai
$33 (liquidation value of loans) assumes the insured deposit
premium liabilities)
— (70/89) [573 (liquidation ~alue
of assets) + piemium].
The premium would ha~ e to exceed $3.42 to
make the purchase and assumption transaction
less costly to the FDIC than liquidation. .- -
\ comparison of equations U and A4 mndtcates
A third resolution method is called transfer of that the ElF loss is smaller under the transfer of
insuied deposits. The FDIC solicits bids from insured deposits than under liquidation for an~
other banks to assume the insured deposit liahil- positu e premium.